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MR. KEYTE:  I want to thank everybody for 
attending Fordham’s first virtual conference.   
First, I want to wish everybody’s families 
and colleagues the best of health and safety.  These 
are, of course, very difficult times for everybody, 
but we’ll get through them. Again, I hope everybody is 
safe and well.  
In the meantime, going virtual in the 
business world and the antitrust field has been for 
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some a challenge; for others, just interesting; for 
me, of course, as a Luddite, a bit of a nightmare, a 
little bit of which I have already experienced today. 
With this conference and going forward, we 
at the Fordham Competition Law Institute are going to 
create a platform for ourselves to have a virtual 
family, do some additional conferences during the 
course of the year, leading up to the annual live 
conference, which we will certainly do every September 
or October. 
Today is our traditional Workshop Day.  We 
have two economic panels coming up, one put on by 
Edgeworth Economics, the other put on by The Brattle 
Group.  We hope everybody participates in those.  
There may be some time for Q&A at the end of those, so 
be ready to look for those. 
In between those two workshops we are going 
to have a Heads of Authority Q&A session. Typically, 
in the live Workshop Day, the heads of authorities 
have their own meeting, a private meeting, that goes 
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on. What we are doing this year, being a little 
creative, is having seven key heads of authority from 
Europe and the United States do a question-and-answer 
session with me addressing tech tools, sustainability, 
and antitrust in the time of pandemic. It should be 
quite interesting, and we will certainly want 
questions from the audience. 
We will also have instant surveys that we 
will do leading up to some of the panels.  We hope 
everybody participates in those too.   
Thank you very much. 
Morning Session I 
 Conflicting Decisions in Pharmaceutical  
Class Certification Workshop 
 
 Moderator: 
George Korenko, PhD 
Partner, Edgeworth Economics 
 
Panelists: 
Jeffrey C. Bank 
Partner, Wilson Sonsini 
 
Justin Bernick 
Partner, Hogan Lovells 
 
Danielle R. Foley 
Partner, Venable LLP 
 
Tram Nguyen, PhD 
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Principal Consultant, Edgeworth Economics 
 
   * * * 
DR. KORENKO:  Good morning. Thank you for 
attending the panel.  I’m George Korenko. I am a 
Partner at Edgeworth Economics, an antitrust 
economist, and I regularly testify in matters 
involving antitrust, commercial damages, and other 
areas.  I have done a lot of work in the 
pharmaceutical industry throughout my career, so this 
is going to be a very interesting panel for me. 
We’ve got a great panel discussion for you 
today.  We have four distinguished panelists.  Our 
topic is the conflicting decisions we have seen in 
recent years in pharmaceutical class certification 
cases. 
When we talk about some of these cases — 
whether it’s Nexium, Solodyn, Lidoderm, Asacol, 
Intuniv, now with Lamictal and Niaspan — it may be 
difficult to interpret where we are in this landscape 
of cases in terms of what it takes to certify a class 
in a pharmaceutical class action case.  Fortunately 
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for us today, our panelists are going to provide some 
insights into where we stand with respect to some of 
the critical issues that seem to be in conflict in 
these cases. 
Our first panelist is Danielle Foley.  She 
is going to discuss the issue of what constitutes a de 
minimis number of uninjured members of a proposed 
class.  Danielle is a Partner at Venable LLP.  She is 
a trial lawyer with extensive experience in complex 
class actions and multiparty litigation involving 
antitrust, false advertising, breach of contract, 
business tort, and unfair competition claims.  
Danielle has defended clients against both the Federal 
Trade Commission and private plaintiffs.  She has 
defended pharmaceutical companies as a trial counsel 
in three reverse-payment jury trials held under the 
United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in FTC 
v. Actavis as well as numerous others. 
Our second panelist will be Jeff Bank, who 
will discuss how courts have come down on the use of 
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averages in pharmaceutical class certification 
matters.  Jeff is a Partner at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich 
& Rosati where he practices antitrust litigation and 
counseling particularly in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Jeff is an experienced litigator 
representing both plaintiffs and defendants.  His work 
has ranged from complex multidistrict litigations and 
global cartel cases to actions against competitors.  
He has successfully defended pharmaceutical, 
technology, and media companies against class actions 
and has experience in all aspects of litigation from 
discovery through appeal.  He regularly counsels 
clients on merger clearance issues and business 
practices.  He has represented a diverse range of 
clients before the FTC, including companies from 
medical device, pharmaceutical, and media sectors.  
Jeff was recently named a Rising Star for 2020 by 
Law360. 
Third, my colleague at Edgeworth Economics 
Tram Nguyen will provide an economic perspective on 
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predominance issues in some of these recent decisions. 
Tram is a Principal Economist at Edgeworth Economics.  
Since joining Edgeworth, Tram has worked on a range of 
antitrust, labor and employment, and public policy 
issues.  She has particularly experience applying 
economic research and analysis in numerous antitrust 
matters within the pharmaceutical industry.  She has 
coauthored papers on economic topics and legal 
developments in the U.S. pharmaceutical antitrust 
cases.  She specializes in quantitative economic 
analysis and modeling within the context of industrial 
organization and antitrust, labor and employment, and 
firm management, and she has extensive experience with 
analyzing large and varied datasets as well as 
expertise in machine learning and statistical tools. 
Finally, last but not least, Justin Bernick 
will close out our panel with a discussion of 
causality issues in pharmaceutical class 
certification.  Justin is a Partner at Hogan-Lovells.  
Justin defends clients in antitrust lawsuits in state 
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and federal courts and has participated in some of the 
nation’s largest antitrust class actions.  He has 
experience in multidistrict and multijurisdictional 
litigation and consumer class actions.  He has 
represented companies in the Department of Justice, 
Federal Trade Commission, and state antitrust 
inquiries, including merger and conduct 
investigations.  Justin litigates a wide range of 
antitrust and competition issues pertaining to mergers 
and acquisitions, allegations of price fixing, market 
allocation, vertical and horizontal agreements, and 
monopolization.  His work spans various industries, 
including life sciences and pharmaceuticals. Recently, 
Justin was named a Rising Star Under 40 by Law360 and 
was also named in the Legal 500 U.S. 
That is our distinguished panel.   
With that, I will get us started with 
Danielle. 
MS. FOLEY:  Thank you, George, and thank you 
all for joining us today.  
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I am Danielle Foley from Venable.  As George 
mentioned, I try a lot of antitrust cases.  
Fortunately, I have tried a number of them in a number 
of years, which can be hard on the schedule but great 
for the experience.  
One thing I have learned is that the 
technology always fails just when you think you need 
it to work, so we’re just going to roll with it.  
Thank you, George, for recovering my slides and 
helping us out today. 
I am going to talk about the concept of de 
minimis in the antitrust pharmaceutical class action 
space.  This is an issue that has been hotly contested 
in cases for a number of years.  It really asks a 
central question — that is, whether the number of 
uninjured class members is too many for the class to 
be certified.  To understand this question you really 
have to think about two major questions: (1) why does 
it matter that there are uninjured class members?; and 
(2) whether there are just too many uninjured class 
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members. 
The question of “Why does it matter?” really 
stems from two things: (1) the nature of the class 
certification tool in the requirements of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rule 23; and (2) the nature of the 
pharmaceutical’s distribution and payment chain, which 
creates unique situations and unique questions for the 
antitrust pharmaceutical space. 
If you think about the nature of the class 
certification tool, class certification, as we all 
know, is the exception in our system to the rule that 
litigation should be conducted by and on behalf of the 
individual named parties.  That is why Rule 23 sets 
out a number of requirements in order for a case to 
proceed as a class action. 
As the First Circuit said in In re Asacol 
Antitrust Litigation,1 “The proper treatment of 
uninjured class members strikes at the heart of the 
competing considerations for Rule 23 certification,” 
and really the question is under Rule 23 whether there 
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are too many uninjured class members can affect all of 
the elements of Rule 23. 
In particular, they can affect predominance, 
which is the question: “Are there too many uninjured 
class members or common issues” — in particular, you 
see this with antitrust injury — “to predominate?”  
You also see it with respect to 
ascertainability: Are there too many uninjured class 
members to be able to identify them and separate them 
from the injured class members in a reasonable and 
administratively feasible manner? 
 
And then manageability, which is really the 
question: Are there too many uninjured class members 
to allow the plaintiffs to present all of their 
evidence and all of their elements in a way that 
protects the defendant’s Seventh Amendment and due 
process rights? 
If you think about the antitrust and the 
 
1 907 F.3d 4251 (1st Cir. 2018). 
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pharmaceutical distribution cases, when you think 
about the pharmaceutical chain, you have to think 
about these cases are not the simple case where there 
is one defendant selling one product at one price 
directly to consumers.  Instead, in all of these cases 
you have a brand company with brand products, you may 
have one generic or you may have multiple generic 
companies all selling different generic products, you 
have insurance companies, you have pharmacy benefit 
managers, you have wholesalers, you have retail stores 
and retail pharmacies of varying sizes, you have 
health and welfare benefit plans, and you have 
consumers, and they are involved in a web of different 
contractual arrangements. 
What that means is not everyone in the 
potential classes are affected in the same way and not 
everyone is injured.  How does this play out in these 
antitrust cases in the pharmaceutical space is that 
you will have different categories of uninjured class 
members.   
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We see this play out largely in the end-
payor classes.  That’s not to say these issues do not 
arise in the direct purchaser classes, but you see 
them predominantly in cases involving end-payors, 
which are the third-party payors and consumers. 
For example, what you see in cases alleging 
the delay of entry of generic products are arguments 
about brand-loyal consumers, and those are consumers 
who, even if a generic had been available earlier, 
would not have switched, they would not have paid a 
lower price, and thus they are not injured.  You will 
similarly see it with respect to consumers who pay a 
flat co-payment for their insurance — if they have the 
same co-payment for the brand as they would have had 
for the generic, they have no overcharge, and thus no 
injury.  You see these types of issues arise in these 
cases. 
Now the question is: How many is too many?  
That is really the question of de minimis. Where did 
this concept of de minimis come from?  It first arose 
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in the First Circuit’s decision in In re Nexium 
Antitrust Litigation2, which was a reverse payment 
case.  
The timing of the class certification 
decision is a little unique and odd because the First 
Circuit issued its opinion after the jury trial was 
completed.  I represented one of the generic 
companies.  After a six-week jury trial, there was a 
full defense victory.  The defendants asked the First 
Circuit to withdraw the appeal, but the First Circuit 
wanted to weigh in on this issue, and so the First 
Circuit proceeded with the Nexium decision.  What the 
First Circuit said had a couple of key lessons and 
takeaways. 
First, it is okay for a class to be 
certified with some number of uninjured class members 
as long as it’s a de minimis number. Now, the First 
Circuit did not define what de minimis was; instead, 
the First Circuit said, “It will be a functional 
test.”  Really, what the First Circuit said was: “Is 
 
2 177 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 15 
 
 
 
 
the number of uninjured so large that it renders a 
class impractical of improper? — that could be more 
than de minimis.” “Is the number of uninjured so large 
that it causes non-common issues to predominate? — 
that wouldn’t be de minimis.”  “Is the number of 
uninjured so large that it violates the defendant’s 
Seventh Amendment or due process rights? — then it 
might not be de minimis.”  But it gave no hard-and-
fast rules and it left it clear as mud in that sense. 
The other takeaway is that parties would 
need to come forward with evidence to support the 
calculation of the number of uninjured class members.  
The court concluded that it had not been shown that 
there was more than a de minimis number of uninjured 
class members.  Really, if you drill down on the 
decision, what you see is that there wasn’t enough 
evidence to take the number of prescriptions of Nexium 
— for example, the number of prescriptions that might 
have stayed on the brand product — to the number of 
class members, and that was a critical issue that the 
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First Circuit had.  You see in the cases that followed 
Nexium real battles between the experts and the 
parties about trying to take the number of 
prescriptions and turn it into the number of uninjured 
consumers. 
What happened after Nexium?  Not 
surprisingly, there are conflicting results and 
scrutiny of the economic evidence. For example, there 
were some decisions, including one that came out right 
after Nexium, just a few months later, the Vista 
Healthplan v. Cephalin, Inc. (Modafinil) case, where 
the court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
said: If it is more than 5 percent — that’s what the 
evidence was, more than 5 percent uninjured — then 
that was not de minimis; that created problems across 
the range of requirements for Rule 23 that affected 
either the ability for the class be ascertainable, for 
the plaintiffs to prove predominance and some 
manageability — so the class was denied. 
On the other end of the spectrum, we saw 
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some courts grant certification where there was a 
range of uninjured class members from 5 percent up to 
10 percent.  In In re Lidoderm, for example, even 
where the plaintiff’s expert conceded 6–7 percent of 
the class members were uninjured, the class was 
certified. 
In re Solodyn is one at the high end of the 
spectrum.  There was a District of Massachusetts 
decision following Nexium that really leaned heavily 
on the Nexium decision.  There the court certified the 
class even though the plaintiff’s expert conceded that 
possibly 10 percent of the class was uninjured, and 
even under some scenarios put forward by the 
plaintiff’s economist that 19—37 percent of the class 
was uninjured.  But, with the guidance of Nexium, the 
court certified the class. 
The takeaway from all of these cases was a 
real battle between the experts at class certification 
about how many class members were uninjured and how do 
you identify them. 
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That takes us to where we are now.  Really, 
you see that there continue to be challenges to 
certifying classes in the antitrust pharmaceutical 
space, and particularly challenges with in the 
consumer class. 
In 2018 the First Circuit went back into the 
fray, as I like to say, of this class certification 
issue in the Asacol decision.  There the First Circuit 
walked back the reach of Nexium and did look at the 
unique facts and circumstances of that case.  In 
Asacol the court denied class certification where at 
least 10 percent of the class was uninjured and the 
court recognized this was likely thousands of 
uninjured class members.  As we will hear from some of 
our other panel members later on, this created real 
issues.  Asacol recognized with predominance an 
antitrust injury, which has become a real focus point 
in a number of other cases that followed. 
As one court has described the Asacol 
decision, “It is likely the death knell of 
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pharmaceutical antitrust class actions brought by 
indirect purchasers.” 
Following Asacol, we have seen again 
increased scrutiny and real difficulty certifying 
classes, in particular, that contained consumers.  So, 
shortly after the Asacol decision, the District of New 
Jersey denied class certification where there were 10 
percent uninjured class members, right in line with 
Asacol, and frankly calling into question the earlier 
decision of Solodyn, which had followed the Nexium 
decision. 
You see other cases, particularly in the 
First Circuit, where there have been a number of these 
cases percolating, where class certification was 
denied, and in particular for consumers.  For example, 
in the In re Loestrin case, the court denied 
certification to a consumer class with 6.7 percent 
uninjured class members but granted certification to 
the third-party payers; so you saw a split of the 
traditional end-payor class there. 
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In re Intuniv was denied class 
certification. 
In Asacol on remand, interestingly, class 
certification was denied.  Even where the plaintiffs 
had offered to jettison the consumers and just focus 
on the institutional payers, the court denied class 
certification. 
So there are cases where on the margins, 
when you are down in the 5 or 6 percent range,  you 
may still find some courts certifying classes with 
that number of uninjured class members, but it is 
harder.  Courts are continuing to grapple with how 
many uninjured class members are too many and what 
level of scrutiny they need to bring to the economic 
evidence.  In order to have your class certified you 
need a strong economic analysis that is backed up by a 
strong testifying expert, frankly.  There is still no 
bright line by the courts to say, “This number is the 
magic number,” but we see if it is greater than 5 
percent there is trouble; if you are at 10 percent, 
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you are very much in trouble of getting your class 
certified. 
I think one of the takeaways that we have 
seen and we will continue to see will be fewer 
consumer classes will likely be pursued and certified, 
with a likely larger focus on the institutional 
members, such as third-party payers, because of the 
real problems that you see with consumer classes and 
the problems present in these cases. 
I will pass it back to you, George. 
DR. KORENKO:  Thank you, Danielle. 
I have one question for you.  You mentioned 
there is no bright line in terms of when you have too 
many or when you don’t have enough to cross that 
threshold of de minimis.  But when the economists of 
the plaintiffs and defense disagree and they are on 
opposite sides of those 10 and 5 percent, how do you 
see the court resolving those issues? 
MS. FOLEY:  You see the court really delving 
in and conducting the rigorous analysis that is 
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required and has been required since Hydrogen 
Peroxide.  There are often competing Daubert motions 
filed against the experts and the courts consider 
those at class certification.  The courts look for 
concessions by the testifying experts and look for 
places that they can put a real hold on it and say, 
“Okay, this is the bottom number; this is the lowest 
number the plaintiffs will concede exists,” or “this 
is the highest number that they will concede exists.”  
It is truly a battle of the experts at that point and 
the court making a factual determination. 
DR. KORENKO:  Thank you for your discussion.  
I think it’s really interesting. 
With that, we will move on to Jeff Bank to 
discuss the use of averages. 
MR. BANK:  Great.  Thanks, George. 
Hi, everyone.  It’s nice to see you here.  I 
wish we were in person, but thanks to James and 
Fordham for organizing this. 
Standard disclaimer: My views expressed 
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today do not necessarily reflect those of my firm, 
colleagues, or clients. 
I am going to talk today about the use of 
averages and recent case law on the subject.  Some of 
my colleagues here today will likely address some of 
the same cases that I am going to speak about but I 
think will be coming at it from different angles. 
Before we get to when are averages used in 
class certification analysis, I want to take a step 
back and see how we got where we are. 
There have been a number of Supreme Court 
cases over the last decade and numerous appellate 
courts have also taken up the question of how a court 
should evaluate class certification motions. 
At the Supreme Court level, the Dukes case, 
the Comcast case, and the Tyson Foods case laid out 
some standards and some guidance for the lower courts 
in terms of evaluating class certification motions 
that I think are particularly important when it comes 
to the question of whether the use of averages is 
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appropriate in class certification analysis. 
The Supreme Court has said that the lower 
courts must conduct a “rigorous” analysis; that 
analysis may overlap with the merits in some 
circumstances; the court should act as a gatekeeper 
regarding expert opinions offered in support or 
against certification; the expert analysis has to 
actually fit the theory of liability.  The Court has 
held and endorsed the use of some statistical evidence 
as a means of showing common proof among class members 
— and we are going to really dig into that in terms of 
the use of averages. 
The Supreme Court has stressed, though, that 
whether and when statistical evidence can be used to 
establish class-wide liability really depends on the 
purpose for which the evidence is being introduced and 
the elements of the underlying cause of action.  It 
becomes very fact-specific very quickly. 
Based on some of those Supreme Court 
rulings, the Third Circuit has described the district 
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court’s responsibility as the following: “The district 
court is supposed to determine that the requirements 
of Rule 23 are met with any factual determinations 
made by a preponderance of the evidence.  The district 
court is to resolve all factual and legal disputes 
relevant to class certification, even if they overlap 
with the merits, and the district court is to consider 
all relevant evidence and arguments including expert 
testimony offered by the moving and opposing parties.”  
So how does that get us to averages?  Well, 
Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the plaintiffs show 
predominance in order to certify a damages class. 
Specifically, they need to show that questions of law 
or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members. 
Whether a class might contain dozens of 
members or thousands or more members, the plaintiff’s 
expert will need to develop a methodology that can be 
used to show that the class members were harmed, and 
that they were harmed in a sufficiently similar way, 
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by the conduct alleged to be unlawful.  Assuming all 
of that can be shown via common proof, the expert will 
also need to show that damages can be calculated 
through a methodology that does not require 
individualized inquiries. 
Experts have a number of possible methods to 
use to show that plaintiffs can meet their burden.  
One method is to show that an overcharge can be 
determined by looking at average real-world prices 
compared to average but-for prices.   
The question for us today is: When is the 
use of averages sufficient to meet the standards of 
Rule 23?  We are going to look at some of the cases in 
the last couple years that have really focused on 
this. 
In re Niaspan (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2019) is a 
really interesting case out of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  It is one of the reverse payment cases.  
There were motions for certification by both the 
direct purchasers and the end-payors and, 
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interestingly enough, the court found one way for the 
directs and one way for the end-payors. 
For the directs, the court found that there 
were very few uninjured customers, so the direct 
purchasers’ expert’s use of averages to show injury 
and harm across the direct purchaser plaintiffs was 
accepted by the court.  The court looked into whether 
there were significant differences between the direct 
purchasers and did not find sufficient differences to 
justify denial of certification.  The court also found 
that the defendants’ insistence that the court focus 
on actual prices was flawed because the experience of 
customers in the real world was not necessarily equal 
to their experience in the but-for world.  It was a 
fairly straightforward decision. 
However, on the end-payor side the court 
found that the expert’s use of averages in the common 
impact analysis simply did not suffice.  The court 
held that the use of averages generally is 
controversial and found that courts have “come down on 
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both sides of the issue at the class certification 
stage.” 
The district court mused that the use of 
averages may be somewhat suspect, but not necessarily 
fatally flawed, and highlighted a theme of what I 
think will run throughout all of the cases that I will 
discuss, that the courts really need to conduct a 
rigorous analysis: they need to look at the specific 
drug product at issue; they need to look at the 
particular class that is being proposed for 
certification; and they need to look at real-world 
market factors that relate to that class and that 
particular drug.  In doing so the court really needs 
to focus on differentiation among the data between 
particular plaintiffs in the proposed class and 
whether there are indicia that the averages being 
proposed by the experts are concealing or not 
concealing certain outliers within the proposed class. 
For the end-payor class in Niaspam the court 
eventually concluded that the use of averages simply 
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does not show whether an individual class member was 
injured; that it masked uninjured proposed class 
members, going to the problems that Danielle just 
spoke about; and that it masked large variations in 
class members’ purchase prices.  Now, of course, there 
may be some variation in purchase prices that is 
acceptable in a common impact analysis, but where the 
variation is so large as to cause individualized 
inquiry to be necessary, then it may be that the class 
is unsuitable for certification. 
In this case, the end-payor plaintiffs 
(EPPs) also really provided no means to identify 
uninjured class members — such as brand loyalists, 
coupon users, and flat co-payers — and we will see how 
that is different in another case in a little bit. 
Some of the other panelists will talk about 
the In re Lamictal Antitrust Litigation case (3d Cir., 
Apr. 22, 2020), so I am going to just focus on a few 
high-level observations here. 
The Third Circuit overturned the district 
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court’s certification of the class in this reverse 
payment case.  I think the decision can fairly be read 
to mean that the courts really need to undergo and 
conduct a rigorous analysis when looking at the Rule 
23 standards and it is not enough to just do so on a 
superficial level.   
Here the lack of rigorous analysis strongly 
colored the Third Circuit’s holding, maybe even more 
significantly than the Third Circuit’s criticism of 
the use of averages.  The Third Circuit emphasized the 
rule that factual matters must be determined at the 
class certification stage if they are necessary to 
determine whether certification should be granted. 
Here the parties had put forth evidence 
regarding complex pricing strategies and machinations 
between the brand and the generic — they were very 
complex — and the Third Circuit essentially chided the 
district court on not conducting enough analysis on 
the impact of those pricing strategies. 
The court also reiterated language that 
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every plaintiff must be able to show antitrust injury, 
kind of bleeding into the analysis that Danielle 
talked about, about what percentage of uninjured 
plaintiff members may be too much.  The district court 
said, “Every plaintiff must be able to show antitrust 
injury through evidence that is common to the class,” 
and it cited to an earlier case, Hydrogen Peroxide: 
damages may not be susceptible of measurement across 
the entire class.  The Third Circuit really dug in 
here on the difference between showing injury versus 
showing damages, and I think that does get conflated 
in some of the district court opinions that we are 
discussing today. 
On the substance of averages, the Third 
Circuit found that there was a very high presence of 
potentially uninjured customers, and that really sank 
the plaintiff’s expert’s use of averages here.  Up to 
a third of the proposed class paid no more or less for 
the generic drug than they would have absent the 
defendant’s supposedly unlawful agreement.  So 33 
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percent potentially uninjured class members was too 
much here. 
There are three other decisions that I want 
to talk about today. 
The decision in In re Loestrin 24 Fe 
Antitrust Litigation  in the District of Rhode Island 
came down in July 2019.  There it was a mixed theory 
by the plaintiffs as to the allegedly unlawful 
conduct.  They alleged that the brand had obtained its 
patent through sham; they alleged that the brand had 
conducted a practice known as product hopping, where 
it allegedly unlawfully transferred the market from 
one product to another to avoid generic entry; and the 
plaintiffs alleged a reverse payment between the brand 
and the generic to delay generic entry. 
The court acknowledged that the complicated 
facts and legal theories really make it challenging to 
figure out the but-for world.  For example, what if 
one of the theories from the plaintiffs was eventually 
proven true but the other two were not; how should an 
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expert figure out what the but-for world would look 
like in that context? 
If the plaintiffs were able to show that all 
three types of conduct were actually unlawful, what 
would the but-for world look like in that context?  
Would each proposed class member be harmed in a 
similar way as a result of all the different methods 
of alleged unlawful conduct, or were some class 
members harmed by one type of conduct but not another? 
The court acknowledged those questions, 
acknowledged that they were complex and difficult, and 
the court focused on the direct purchaser’s expert’s 
use of averages, particularly in the purported context 
of damages.  The court noted that the methodology put 
forth by the expert incorporates the variation across 
class members in the actual prices they paid and in 
the prices they would have paid, and the court said 
that providing averages correctly summarizes the 
combined effects of all of these class members in a 
single class-wide overcharge measure.  The court said 
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that aggregating damages in this way is well accepted. 
The defendants focused on trying to show 
differences between the proposed class members: those 
purchasers who had been purchasing the brand product 
but would still continue to purchase the brand 
product; those purchasers who had been purchasing the 
brand product but in the but-for world would have 
switched to the generic product; and those purchasers 
who only purchased generic products and alleged harm.  
At the end of the day, the court said that the model 
works for them all.   
I think one of the keys here, though, is 
going back to the point that this case really involved 
multipronged alleged unlawful conduct.  The court 
noted that “defendants had not earned the benefit of 
the doubt when the very reason we cannot know the 
answer to that question is because of their alleged 
wrongdoing” and cited to the Namenda case.  So the 
court essentially put the burden back on the 
defendants to overcome the fact that the alleged 
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conduct was so complex. 
In re Restasis Antitrust Litigation 
(E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020) is similar.  There it was an 
end-payor class that sought certification.  It was 
another complicated case with an alleged multiprong 
scheme to delay generic entry. 
The expert used a “yardstick” approach, 
comparing what the but-for world would have been had 
generics entered earlier for Restasis.  The expert 
looked to another similar drug product to see what 
happened there in the real world and then used 
averages to calculate damages. 
Notably, the expert in Restasis did identify 
and exclude proposed class members that were flat co-
payers — government entities and fully insured through 
their health plans — so the expert took steps to 
identify and exclude potentially uninjured class 
members from the analysis, which I think makes a 
difference.  To Danielle’s earlier point, the experts 
are really going to have to dig in and do a much more 
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in-depth analysis to identify those uninjured class 
members and try to exclude them early on in the 
analysis. 
Similar to the Loestrin case, the court 
pointed to the complexity of defendant’s alleged 
wrongdoing as the cause of any uncertainty in the 
class certification analysis.  The court said, “If the 
plaintiffs cannot prove their damages with precision, 
the most elementary conceptions of justice and public 
policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk 
of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created.” 
Interesting that at the class certification 
stage the court is essentially holding the defendant 
out as the wrongdoer and placing the uncertainty on 
them there, before really any finding on the merits, 
and even in the class certification proceedings the 
court did not make any finding on the merits that the 
defendant was in fact a wrongdoer and yet held them to 
a heightened standard. 
In In re Zetia Antitrust Litigation (E.D. 
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Va. June 18, 2020) there was a direct purchaser class 
in the Eastern District of Virginia.  Zetia came after 
the Lamictal decision.  The defendant cited Lamictal 
and said, “The plaintiff’s use of averages in Zetia 
was improper and that the court did not conduct enough 
of a rigorous analysis on the plaintiff’s expert.” 
The court did acknowledge that under 
Lamictal the use of averages may be inappropriate in 
some circumstances, however the court distinguished 
Lamictal noting the unique contracting strategy 
involving a nuance in the particular anti-epilepsy 
drug market that was at issue in Lamictal, and the 
court acknowledged that the defendant’s real-world 
pricing strategies may impact whether averages can be 
used; you have to look at the market factors.  But 
ultimately, the Zetia court found that the defendants 
failed to put forward evidence that the Zetia drug was 
marketed in the same way Lamictal was. 
So the burden does shift to the defendants 
to come forward and show that real-world market 
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factors, nuances about the particular drug, unique 
circumstances about payers and purchasers in a 
particular drug market, differences between channels 
(whether through wholesale, retail, institutional) — 
that those really make a difference and foreclose the 
use of averages. 
So where does that leave us today?  It is 
pretty clear that the courts all acknowledge that they 
have to conduct a rigorous analysis, that the merits 
may come into play and may really matter at the class 
certification stage.  It also has emphasized the 
battle of the experts that will occur at class 
certification even before the battle of the experts at 
the merits stage, becomes a precursor to that, and in 
some ways may limit the analyses and arguments that 
can be put forth at the merits stage depending on what 
the parties put forward at class certification and 
depending on the court’s holdings at the class 
certification stage. 
Sophisticated econometric analyses are 
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absolutely necessary in class certification, 
particularly in end-payor cases where you have 
distribution chains in the pharmaceutical industry 
that are incredibly complex.  To try to show that 
common proof can be used to prove impact and damages 
for those end-payors at the bottom of the chain really 
requires significant and substantial analysis, and 
Daubert motions are going to become even more common 
at the class certification stage than they already 
were. 
It is also important to keep an eye on the 
non-pharma cases.  Of course there was the Tyson Foods 
case that I talked about earlier; the Aluminum 
Warehousing (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020) case in the 
Southern District of New York; the earlier cases on 
rail freight and hydrogen peroxide.  I think the use 
of averages is going to become a hot topic in numerous 
industries and looking outside pharma is going to be 
important. 
I do think, though, that pharma is unique in 
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many ways.  There have been rapid and significant 
changes in the industry over the last ten to fifteen 
years — consolidation horizontally and vertically; 
growing power of pharmacy benefit managers to 
influence pricing and supply at multiple rungs in the 
chain; the difference between a generic product, a 
brand product, a specialty product is blurring more 
and more so competition between pure brands and 
generics looks different now than it did ten or 
fifteen years ago in some circumstances; complex 
insurance agreements that may require individualized 
inquiry; growing use of rebates and discounts to 
compete for particular customers or channels. 
All of these complexities weigh against the 
use of averages because it really becomes a question 
of whether it is possible to show that any 
pharmaceutical purchaser at any level is truly 
“average.” 
George, back to you. 
DR. KORENKO:  Thank you, Jeff.  Very 
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interesting. 
I do have one question.  You talked a lot 
about the merits issues coming up more and more at the 
class certification stage.  In my experience, a lot of 
times the courts are reluctant to address at least 
some of the merits issues.  Do you see this changing 
as we go forward given some of the recent cases we 
have seen? 
MR. BANK:  I do.  I think, especially with 
the Lamictal decision, the courts are really under 
fire to dig into the facts, figure out the particular 
nuances relating to a specific drug, figure out what 
the competition in the marketplace was, figure out 
what it would have been in the but-for world.  So I do 
think the merits are going to become more and more 
important, which has important implications for the 
litigation overall. 
I know in the past in some cases we have 
tried to bifurcate class certification discovery 
versus merits discovery.  I think it is going to 
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become even more difficult to bifurcate that.  It 
means that you may not be able to do class 
certification proceedings as early in the case as 
plaintiffs or defendants might want and class 
certification may have to wait until the end of fact 
discovery. 
Third-party discovery is, of course, 
critical in pharmaceutical antitrust cases, and 
beginning that process of sending out subpoenas to 
those third parties as early as possible is going to 
be critical. 
I think the merits findings at the class 
certification stage will also accelerate the 
litigation.  There will be fewer novel issues to 
address at the summary judgment stage, and you may 
start seeing settlements and resolutions come earlier 
in litigation than they would have otherwise. 
DR. KORENKO:  Thank you, Jeff.  Very 
interesting. 
Next we will turn to Tram to talk about the 
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economics of predominance. 
DR. NGUYEN:  Thank you, George. 
To continue the discussion I am going to 
cover the economic analysis of predominance and, in 
particular, I will talk about some of the direct 
purchaser cases and end-purchaser cases from the angle 
of antitrust injury and damages, and then I will 
review some recent court decisions on the issue of 
damages and on the issue of uninjured customers. 
First, let’s talk about the economics of 
class certification. From the perspective of 
economics, when we talk about the requirements of 
class certification, it usually hinges on two 
fundamental questions. 
The first question is: Can plaintiffs show 
with common evidence common injury to the entire 
class?  This means can all or nearly all class members 
be shown to have suffered antitrust injury from the 
conduct — for example, can the plaintiff show with one 
regression model that all class members have suffered 
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an overcharge? 
Once the first question is established, then 
the second question becomes: Can plaintiffs also rely 
on the formulaic approach to calculating damages? 
In economics we define a customer to have 
suffered injury when the actual price that he or she 
paid is higher than the but-for price absent the 
conduct, and damages is then the difference between 
the two prices. 
For an individual inquiry regarding the use 
of averages, let’s review a specific direct purchaser 
case.  In general, a lot of cases that we see today 
have a common formula where the plaintiff’s experts 
would rely on average prices to show common proof of 
injury to the class.  What the plaintiff’s experts 
usually do is to calculate one average but-for price 
for all class members and also, in a similar fashion, 
what is the average actual price for all class 
members.  If the average but-for price is below the 
average actual price, then the class is considered to 
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have suffered injury. 
In some of these cases, the defendant’s 
experts might point out that for some class members 
the actual price that they pay might be below the 
average but-for price and therefore they are uninjured 
by the conduct.  But if the number is small, as 
Danielle explained before, the courts have concluded 
that a small absolute number of uninjured class 
members might be picked off in a manageable manner and 
that would not hinder class certification. 
In the case of Lamictal, as Jeff explained 
the background of the case before, this is a case 
where the court actually went in the opposite 
direction.  In April of this year, the court of 
appeals vacated and remanded the class certification 
decision by the district court. 
Lamictal is an interesting case where the 
facts of the case made the use of averages become 
inappropriate and we can take a closer look at why 
that is the case. In this case the brand manufacturer 
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GSK, instead of competing with the generic on 
introducing an authorized generic product, competed on 
price.  That means GSK then had negotiations with 
purchasers or had strategic pricing, and that in turn 
caused Teva, the generic manufacturer, to also lower 
its price preemptively.  The defendant’s expert 
actually showed that twenty-five out of thirty-three 
generic-only purchasers likely paid less in the actual 
world than absent the conduct.  This leads to the 
situation where we have a large percentage of the 
class being uninjured or likely uninjured by the 
conduct and there is a need for individualized inquiry 
to look at individual circumstances and study whether 
an individual class member was actually injured or 
not. 
To demonstrate how this works we can look at 
a simple example where there are only four wholesalers 
in the class and each one has an actual price that 
they pay per pill and the but-for price.  The actual 
price here is the blue bar and the but-for price is 
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the orange bar.   
If we follow the plaintiff’s theory of 
injury, the plaintiff’s expert would compute the 
average actual price (the blue line) and the average 
but-for price (the orange line).  As long as the blue 
line is above the orange line, then there is injury to 
the entire class, and this is true in this example. 
However, if we look at the individual data, 
Wholesaler 2 and Wholesaler 4 did not suffer any 
injury because the actual price is below their but-for 
price, and they make up 50 percent of the class.  This 
is an example where averages actually mask individual 
differences in prices and there is a need for 
individualized inquiry into the question of injury. 
Next I will cover the issue of identifying 
uninjured class members.  As Danielle has mentioned, 
it is common to have uninjured class members in a 
class.  But when does it become an issue to class 
certification? 
In the case of Asacol, as we have heard 
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today, the plaintiff proposed a similar mechanism to 
Nexium where in this proposal the claims administrator 
could rely on an unrebutted affidavit from putative 
class members to identify who was injured or uninjured 
by the conduct.  But the First Circuit in the case of 
Asacol actually held that if these affidavits could be 
rebutted, then the approach is no longer appropriate. 
But in the case of Asacol there is a generic 
delay and also a product hop, which means the brand 
manufacturer in the case switched the product from one 
formulation to another and forced consumers into a 
hard switch before the generic became available.  The 
goal is to retain market share for the branded product 
before the generic entry. 
Both sides in this case, the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s experts, estimated approximately 10 
percent of the class would be uninjured by this 
conduct.  Because of the nature of the case, we might 
have brand stayers; we might have consumers who 
purchased the old formulation and have stopped 
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purchasing the new formulation altogether before the 
generic was available; or there could be consumers who 
are insensitive to price because they have the same 
co-pay for brand and generic products, so they would 
also not be injured by the conduct. 
The problem becomes how we identify these 
members in the class from the data.  In the case of 
Asacol, identifying these uninjured class members 
became an infeasible task.  The plaintiffs proposed no 
other mechanism besides following Nexium to identify 
and remove uninjured members from the class.  And, 
because this is an end-payor case, 10 percent 
of an end-payor class is not “a small absolute number” 
that can be removed before trial, so the court did not 
certify the class. 
But what is interesting with Asacol is also 
there is another wrinkle on top of the issue with 
uninjured class members.  The plaintiffs in the case 
also proposed an approach where the plaintiff’s 
expert, Dr. Conti, proposed a class-wide proof of 
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injury by estimating that the generic drug would take 
up 90 percent of market share when it became available 
and they could use this probability to prove that all 
or nearly all class members were injured.  But the 
court concluded that in this case if we use the 90 
percent market share to show that an individual 
consumer would likely purchase the generic, and 
therefore be injured, it would lead to the wrong 
conclusion that everyone was injured by the conduct. 
We can dissect what this means, but first I 
want to point out that the district court’s opinion on 
90 percent of market share means that 90 percent of 
the class being injured is also misleading because we 
are talking about a market of a product, which doesn’t 
really mean an individual only consumes one product or 
one pill in the market. 
But even if we assume that 90 percent of the 
market will convert to the generic, that can be used 
as an approximation to the probability that a person 
will purchase the generic, it still does not mean that 
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this is going to be proof to show that the entire 
class is injured because if we look at a simple 
example with paying consumers in the market, we know 
that nine out of ten will purchase the generic and the 
other one will purchase the brand, for simplicity. 
But if we look at a given consumer, we do 
not know whether in the but-for world that given 
consumer will still purchase the brand or the generic, 
and therefore is uninjured or injured by the conduct.  
If we go ahead and assume that everyone is likely to 
consume a generic and that therefore they are injured, 
we will arrive at the wrong conclusion that ten out of 
ten consumers here will purchase the generic.  But the 
data show that in fact there is one person who is 
uninjured, so probability methodology is not a 
deterministic approach for class-wide proof of injury. 
Now if we combine both the problem of the 
use of averages and uninjured customers in an end-
payor case, we arrive at In re Niaspan Antitrust 
Litigation (MDL No. 2460, 2020). 
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The use of averages, in the view of the 
Niaspan court, is that it is a common approach and can 
be acceptable as long as differentiation in the data 
being used to compute the average prices is not so 
large that the average becomes misleading or, in the 
facts of the case, allow that the averages do not 
conceal the true story behind the data.  Niaspan is 
again a generic-delay case where there is an end-
consumer class including the third-party payors and 
end-consumers who purchased Niaspan or the generic 
version of Niaspan.   
In this case, the plaintiff’s expert relied 
on an average overcharge model that relied on several 
assumptions, the literature on generic market 
substitution rate and price discount, and the 
plaintiff’s expert also used the rise in quantity from 
the Niaspan product and the yardstick product to 
calculate a yardstick model.  There are several issues 
with this approach. 
First of all, the yardstick model is not a 
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model to show class-wide injury and there is large 
variation in the data regarding restriction costs to 
third-party payers and consumers.  Specifically, from 
the data, third-party payers might pay anywhere 
between zero to $100 for the prescription, and 
similarly consumers can also pay between zero to $250, 
so immediately the average will mask all of these 
large variations in the data. 
But the issue also lies with the assumptions 
that the model is based upon.  If we use the 
literature to approximate the generic substitution 
rate, the literature is based on a variety of drugs 
that might not be specific to the drug at issue or 
might not have the same characteristics as the drug at 
issue.  We can think, for example, of a lifesaving 
drug, a psychoactive drug, might have very different 
characteristics, and therefore consumers might be less 
likely to switch to the generic, so the generic 
substitution rate is not the same as what the 
literature says. 
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Similarly, the yardstick products also might 
not have the same characteristics as the product at 
issue.  But, most importantly, the plaintiff’s 
expert’s model in this case is an average overcharge 
model, and that is what it means — it computes an 
average overcharge.  At best, it can calculate the 
overcharge across all class members on average but 
does not really prove whether an individual class 
member, PPT or consumer, actually suffered an injury. 
So the court in the case of Niaspan 
concluded that the use of averages in the yardstick 
model is not a proof of class-wide injury; it masks 
uninjured class members; and also large variations in 
the data.  Also, as Jeff mentioned, the end-payor 
plaintiffs in this case also provided no means to 
identify uninjured class members.  They could be brand 
loyalists who will continue to purchase the brand even 
when the generic was available; or consumers who use a 
coupon in their purchase and therefore do not pay a 
higher price; or flat co-payors who have the same co-
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pay for the brand and the generic.  This became an 
important issue in this case even when the EPPs 
proposed to use third-party data to identify the 
uninjured class members.   
We can think of the issue with flat co-
payors.  Even if we have third-party transactional 
data to identify a flat co-payor in the data, we would 
have to observe the same consumer who purchased both 
brand and generic at different points in time and 
under the same insurance management structure.  But, 
in reality, we might only observe the consumers who 
purchase only the brand or only the generic; or, even 
if they made a purchase of both, they might have 
switched from one insurer to another insurer over this 
period of time; or their insurance plan structure 
might have changed and therefore their co-pay 
structure changed.  So it became quite impossible to 
identify the uninjured class members from the class 
even if the plaintiff proposed to exclude flat co-
payers from the class definition. 
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In conclusion, the issue of common proof of 
injury becomes an important factor, continues to be an 
important factor, in class certification decisions 
where, in particular, an average overcharge model, 
which is often relied on by plaintiff’s experts, is 
not a common proof of injury, especially when we see 
that there are large variations in prices in the data 
and the use of averages cannot mask individualized 
inquiry. 
Also, plaintiff’s and defendant’s experts, 
even if they focus on assessing subgroups in the class 
that might be uninjured, the issue of identifying who 
these uninjured customers are becomes important.  If 
it is complicated to identify and remove uninjured 
class members from the class, this might become a 
problem for class certification. 
Last but not least, probably the approach is 
not a deterministic approach and cannot be used as 
common evidence for class-wide injury. 
Thank you, George. 
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DR. KORENKO:  Thank you, Tram.  Very 
interesting. 
I want to pick up on one thing that you 
mentioned.  You talked about probability is not 
deterministic and how the 90 percent probability of 
switching to a generic does not tell you that 
necessarily 90 percent of the class is injured. Can 
you explain a little more why a probability does not 
tell you the same thing as the fact of injury? 
DR. NGUYEN:  The answer is twofold. 
First of all, if you look at a market as a 
whole, we are looking at transactions or the number of 
products being sold in a market, not the number of 
consumers in a market because the same patient might 
refill their prescription a few times or buy multiple 
products at once.  So the 90 percent market rate does 
not translate to 90 percent of the class purchasing 
the generic or the brand. 
On top of that, this is the average 
probability for the entire market, but each individual 
 58 
 
 
 
 
will have a different probability of purchasing the 
brand or the generic depending on their insurance plan 
or their personal preferences or their doctor’s 
preferences for the drug.  So we cannot just apply the 
same rule of thumb, 90 percent probability, to 
everyone in the class.  We have to look at their 
individual circumstance to determine whether in their 
but-for world, given all of their individual factors, 
will they purchase the brand or the generic. 
DR. KORENKO:  Great.  Thank you, Tram.  I 
appreciate that. 
With that, we will turn it over to Justin. 
MR. BERNICK:  Thanks, George.  Thanks, 
everybody, for listening and for having us here to 
speak with you today. 
I am going to take a little bit of a step 
back here.  We talked a lot about lack of injury, 
uninjured consumers, using averages, proportions of 
uninjured consumers.  I am going to look at little bit 
at the question of “Why?” — underlying those 
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determinations that there may be uninjured consumers 
in the class, what is the underlying causal reason for 
that lack of injury or the injury itself? 
Just speaking for myself as an impatient 
trial lawyer, I like to ask, “Well, what is the core 
issue in dispute here?”  Often, these pay-for-delay 
cases hinge on some underlying factual predicate.  To 
what extent can a court grapple with that at the class 
certification stage, or should the experts just assume 
that the actual predicate is true and defer that 
calculus to later on down the road for a merits 
decision at summary judgment or trial?  There are some 
cases that go in different directions on that. 
I think the first predicate to keep in mind 
is that it is pretty well established under Rule 23 
that it requires an evidentiary showing, meaning facts 
or some sort of common proof.  We talked a lot about 
the economic models that plaintiffs put forward to 
attempt to satisfy that burden of common proof of harm 
or impact to the class members. 
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We have talked a lot about how that economic 
model, that common proof that the class might put 
forward, could mask individuals who are not injured to 
the point where common questions no longer predominate 
under Rule 23 and a class should no longer be 
certified. 
But again, there is this closely related 
question here about the factual or causal predicate to 
the alleged injury — what actually causes this 
proportion of injured class members that could defeat 
class certification at the end of the day?  What if 
plaintiffs’ common evidence or their economic model is 
based on an underlying factual or causal predicate 
that is just disputed or even demonstrably false?  
There are lots of these factual predicates 
underlying a pay-for-delay case. It could be the 
underlying validity of the patent; it could be FDA 
approval issues; it could be at-risk entry by a 
generic that has occurred even apart from any 
agreement that is being challenged in the case; and it 
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could deal with other issues related to a but-for 
entry date — all sorts of underlying factual 
predicates that are assumptions that are built into 
the economic models that we talked about earlier in 
the day. 
So what if some of those predicates are just 
not true or disputed?  Is a court required to grapple 
with those at class certification? There are some 
conflicting cases in this area, and we’ve talked about 
some of them already, but I am going to talk about 
them in a little bit different way than just what the 
economic model might predict. 
Lamictal is one of the cases that has come 
up repeatedly today.  There, of course, it’s a direct 
purchaser.  The part that I’m going to talk about is 
the drug purchaser case challenging GSK’s agreement 
with Teva not to launch an authorized generic.   
The district court certified the class.  The 
Third Circuit reversed with some really strong 
language about how the judge should have resolved 
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factual disputes.  If you are a defense attorney 
primarily, you are going to see a lot in here that you 
will like — we will talk in a bit about the language 
in other cases that if you are on the plaintiff’s side 
you might like — but there is a lot of strong 
language, including the language on this slide, about 
how the judge really should have grappled with some of 
those factual disputes, and language that is stronger 
than you see in a lot of class certification opinions. 
The question is: “Why?” 
Here I think it is important to understand 
the predicate for the Third Circuit’s finding that the 
model masked averages and masked uninjured consumers.  
One of those predicates is that the Third Circuit 
noted that the defendants argue that GSK competed with 
Teva, even though it did not have an authorized 
generic, through this unique contracting strategy of 
offering targeted discounts to pharmacies on the 
branded product, the branded Lamictal; and that that 
strategy, in turn, led Teva to reduce the price of its 
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generic even though there was no authorized generic 
(AG) on the market.  In some ways, this is a frontal 
assault to the legal theory in the case, that the No-
AG provision actually reduced competition. Here you 
had a contrary theory being offered by the defendants 
that there was robust price competition even with the 
alleged reverse-payment agreement. 
You could imagine some court saying, “Well, 
that’s a merits issue.  Let’s kick the can down the 
road.  We’ll deal with that at summary judgment.  The 
plaintiffs are entitled to assume for purposes of 
their economic model that there was causality, there 
was impact, despite this contracting strategy.  That 
is something for a jury or a fact finder to resolve 
later on in the case.” 
But the Third Circuit said, “No.”  The 
defendant tried to argue, successfully here, that this 
contracting strategy led to lower prices for certain 
purchasers than they would have paid even if GSK had 
launched an authorized generic.  The court said that 
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the district court should have grappled with that 
underlying factual dispute about whether Teva lowered 
its price in response to this contracting strategy, 
and whether absent the settlement agreement GSK would 
have pursued the strategy. 
In other words, the Third Circuit was 
saying, “You need to resolve this battle of the 
experts.  You need to resolve this underlying factual 
predicate about causality at the class certification 
stage; it’s not something you can punt on and just 
make an assumption about later on in the case.” 
Again, there are the other issues that are 
premised on that about averages and lack of injury to 
a certain proportion of consumers, but there is this 
underlying causal question that the Third Circuit said 
the district court should have resolved. 
And there are cases going the other way.  
Again, these are cases that we’ve talked about before 
too. 
In re Solodyn Antitrust Litigation (2017 WL 
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4621777, C.D. Mass. 2017) was a direct purchaser case 
challenging reverse payment from Medicis to Impax.  
Here the issue was at-risk generic entry: you had 
various generics that were entering at risk, and the 
defendants argued that the plaintiffs could not 
satisfy the prominence inquiry under Rule 23 because, 
in part, generic Solodyn was available through at-risk 
entry during the class period; so even though you had 
exclusion of a potential generic competitor, you’ve 
had generic competition present in the market; and, if 
there was, then how could you have an actual impact to 
class members? 
This sounds in some ways similar to the 
Lamictal story: If you have this underlying factual or 
causal predicate that is missing for the alleged harm, 
or some reason why the harm would not be suffered by 
the class members, then shouldn’t the court consider 
that at the class certification stage? 
Here in Solodyn the court  reached the exact 
opposite conclusion with some language that is helpful 
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to plaintiffs in these cases, finding essentially that 
the question of whether the agreement reduced 
competition in light of at-risk injury was a question 
for the jury; it is not a question for the court that 
applies certification — let’s push that back and 
decide it later — but the plaintiffs are entitled to 
rely on this assumption of causality and that the at-
risk entry would not have impacted the class members 
and prevented the injury that they suffered. 
In re Glumetza Antitrust Litigation (2020 WL 
4732333 (N.D. Cal. 2020) was a similar story, a direct 
purchaser case challenging a no-authorized-generic 
agreement.  The defendants argued that Lupin would not 
have entered because it expected to lose the patent 
suit.  Again, this is a core factual predicate: if 
there would have been no entry, there would have been 
no harm to any of the class members. 
The court there, sort of like with Solodyn 
said, said that the plaintiff’s expert was of course 
permitted to assume the “causal link” for purposes of 
 67 
 
 
 
 
the model of impact and assume that Lupin would have 
entered and that the alleged price hikes would not 
have occurred.  Again, the court said, in language 
that will be helpful to plaintiffs, that these 
questions would be decided at summary judgment or at 
trial and can be answered with common evidence. 
I think the common thread that I see in 
these cases — because I think there is a common 
thread, even though on their face they seem to be 
anomalous with one another — I think the court in 
Glumetza put its finger on one of the important 
distinctions here, and that is whether or not those 
causal questions, those questions related to impact, 
are capable of yielding common answers to the class.  
If those causal questions could result in 
individualized inquiry and break down into mini-trials 
for each of the individual consumers, then those are 
causal questions that I think under Lamictal courts 
are obligated to address at the class certification 
stage.  You can’t just punt on those questions if the 
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answers to those causal questions do not reveal common 
answers. 
But I think in Glumetza the court was saying 
that when you have this underlying factual predicate 
that is common to the class, or potentially common to 
the class, and yields common answers, that is not one 
that the court should be wading into.   
There are some specific quotes in Glumetza 
that go to this issue.  “Defendants raised the patent 
merits to change the but-for scenario and jump ahead 
to the impact analysis,” and the court said that 
wasn’t appropriate. 
The court also said: “The class doesn’t just 
break down if the defendants are right.  Instead, the 
entire class loses.” 
Another way the court put it is: The harms 
don’t become individualized; instead “the harms will 
simply fall away entirely.” 
In other words, if the defendants are right 
that there would not have been injury, then nobody was 
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injured, and that is susceptible to common proof and 
something that the court can address later on after 
the class is certified. 
I think that’s where I would leave things in 
terms of the overall conclusion here.  The plaintiffs 
and defendants both tried to inject merits-related 
issues or questions that they perceived to favor them 
in the class certification inquiry for the court to 
resolve, and where we see those getting traction, if 
at all, is where those underlying causal questions or 
impact or injury questions are not susceptible to 
common proof. 
Maybe another way to frame it — although 
this is sort of a semantic distinction — is in my mind 
the causation question is about whether the alleged 
conduct caused the anticompetitive harm — for example, 
whether the reverse payment settlement caused delayed 
generic entry. 
The impact question is a slightly different 
question: Whether a particular class member was 
 70 
 
 
 
 
injured by the anticompetitive harm.  Courts might 
grapple with those underlying causation or merits 
question, that it’s necessary in order to determine 
whether common proof can show impact to each of the 
individual consumers.   
If the answer is yes, that that question 
related to causation or impact could lead to 
individualized inquiry, then that is something that 
courts should, and sometimes do, as in Lamictal, to 
resolve at the class certification stage. 
I’m intentionally trying to be brief in 
order to have a little bit of time for questions at 
the end, so back to you, George. 
DR. KORENKO:  Thank you, Justin.  Very 
interesting.  I appreciate the discussion. 
One question I have for you is: when you are 
talking about the causation issues, I am wondering — 
obviously, this is a slightly different tack — when we 
look at the Comcast case, where the damages analysis 
had to line up with the theory of the case, how does 
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that dovetail with the causation issues you are 
discussing? 
MR. BERNICK:  I think it dovetails pretty 
well actually.  Comcast has taken on sort of a 
mythical life of its own in the class certification 
arena where people try to make Comcast arguments in 
every case and they will spin Comcast in different 
ways. 
At its core what I think Comcast is about is 
that the plaintiff’s expert’s model must be rejected 
as common evidence of impact if it cannot distinguish 
the impact of the unlawful conduct from other factors.  
In that case, as folks probably know, there were four 
theories of impact and injury.  Only one of those 
actually survived by the time the case got to the 
Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court said that because the 
model just calculated aggregate damages from all four 
theories but could not isolate the effect or impact of 
the one theory that survived, then the model had to 
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fail; the model was no longer causally linked to the 
theory that had survived in the case.  Another way of 
putting it might be that the expert model did not fit 
the legal theory that was still on the table and could 
not isolate those particular damages. 
In my personal experience, Comcast is often 
invoked but somewhat rarely successful in isolation in 
defeating class certification.  I think that is 
probably true largely because plaintiffs and experts 
are careful to try to ensure at least some alignment 
between the legal theory or the causal theory that is 
being alleged and the economic model particularly in 
light of Comcast. 
The actual situation at issue in Comcast, 
where you have a damages model that contemplates harm 
from theories that are no longer being alleged or 
things that are not unlawful, is somewhat rare, but 
again it is invoked pretty often. 
There are some exceptions where Comcast does 
get some traction. Skelaxin would be a good example, 
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where the district court denied certification for end-
payors for a variety of reasons, including 
ascertainability.  But the court also there noted 
problems under Comcast, that the plaintiffs’ model 
included transactions with entities that the 
plaintiffs later argued should be excluded from the 
class.  So there was a disconnect between what the 
model was actually modeling and what the plaintiffs 
were alleging in terms of harm, and that is the type 
of situation where Comcast can get some traction. 
In contrast, you have cases like Modafinil 
where the Third Circuit reversed the denial of 
certification.  It was over objections by the 
defendants that the plaintiffs’ model inappropriately 
masked individual issues, like Comcast did, and just 
calculated aggregate damages from five separate 
reverse-payment agreements rather than looking at them 
individually.  The court said: No, that Comcast issue 
is not really sufficient to deny certification here, 
and distinguished Comcast on the grounds that the 
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plaintiffs’ theory was premised on the aggregated 
injury from those five different agreements. 
So there are cases that go in different 
directions, but in a vacuum, George, I do not see 
Comcast as often the sole reason why certification is 
denied in these cases.  It is often invoked but, 
again, because everyone is sort of hyper-focused on 
this issue of alignment between the legal theory and 
causal theory and the model of impact.  I have not 
seen it be successful in a vacuum by itself with a lot 
of regularity. 
DR. KORENKO:  Thank you, Justin. 
With that, I’m happy to turn to questions.  
While we wait for some questions to come in, I am 
curious if any of our panelists have questions for 
each other in terms of these presentations.  There has 
been an overlap clearly in terms of these discussions, 
but there are a lot of issues that are nuanced, as  
you all distinguished the Lamictal case from some 
others because of the unique contracting strategies 
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and new fact patterns.   
I think fundamentally that gets down to some 
of the merits-based issues that Jeff and Justin talked 
to, and then, ultimately, those issues affect the de 
minimis issue because once you have that fact pattern 
and you have identified these uninjured class members, 
how many are there; and, to Tram’s point, how do you 
figure out who they are even if you know how many? 
MS. FOLEY:  I can ask a question for Tram 
just as an economist.  What do you think are the most 
difficult issues to answer as an economist?  What are 
the most interesting ones to look at from your 
perspective in the class certification arena? 
For me, each of the questions under Rule 23 
really do have an economic aspect to them.  I would be 
curious from an economic perspective which ones you 
think are the most interesting or the most difficult 
to answer. 
DR. NGUYEN:  I think the most interesting 
issue to look at usually from my experience is how do 
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we determine the but-for scenario for each individual 
consumer, whether they are a TPP or an end-payor, 
because the data in these types of cases does not 
really include everything and we have to tease 
information from the documents, from the line 
structure, and the data and transactional data 
together.  We do not observe net prices, for example, 
that a TTP paid or an end-consumer paid, so in order 
to figure out that whole story and piece them together 
I think is one of the most exciting and interesting 
exercises that we have done. 
I think it is also a valuable lesson for 
both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts to think 
about rather than just immediately jump to looking 
only at the average price because that doesn’t really 
tell even a small part of the whole story. 
MR. BERNICK:  I have one comment/question 
that anyone can chime in on.  One thing lurking in the 
background here is if you are on the defense side and 
you identify that there is a bunch of uninjured 
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consumers, very often you find yourself in the box of 
saying, “Well, now that I’ve identified them, the 
court can draw a circle around them and exclude them 
from the class.” 
There is a tension between digging into the 
model and identifying who is not injured and walking 
into a situation where they can be easily carved out 
and excluded and have a more cohesive class.  So there 
is this tightrope of “Well, there are uninjured 
consumers, but we have no idea who they are.  We can 
tell the court that it is 10 percent of the class, but 
we really do not know who that 10 percent is.” 
I am curious about others’ experiences and 
how they navigate that issue.  I know that’s always a 
tightrope that you run into. 
MS. FOLEY:  I’ll be happy to take that one 
because that is one of the issues you often face in 
these cases.  Conceptually, you can say, “Look, there 
are uninjured” — I think, as the court in the 
Modafinil case said it — “but I cannot tell you 
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exactly who they are because every single one of these 
consumers has the possibility of being the brand 
loyalist, the flat co-payer, and you have to look at 
the coupon usage.  I can tell you from looking at the 
group of data I have that there is at least 10 percent 
or so that are uninjured, but I cannot tell you ‘It’s 
Joe, it’s Sally, it’s Mary’ — I cannot tell you who 
they are.” 
Trying to get the court to understand that 
issue is definitely a struggle because you do not want 
to fall into that trap of “Oh, I have identified the 
people right here; just carve them out; it is easy,” 
because it is really just not that hard to do.  I 
think that is a real problem. 
MR. BANK: I think it also highlights the 
difference between direct purchasers and end-payors.  
With the direct purchaser classes, especially in 
pharma antitrust, they are usually limited to a few 
dozen at most, and identifying uninjured direct 
purchasers or power purchasers may be a lot easier at 
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that level.  But once you start getting down to the 
end-payors, consumers, insurers, or even indirect 
reseller plaintiffs, the ability to identify the 
particular uninjured customers gets harder and harder. 
I expect that to play out over the next few  
years in the cases where, again, it is another hurdle 
to certification for the end-payors that maybe the 
direct purchasers figure out.  Maybe their experts are 
better equipped to come up with the analysis that 
excludes the uninjured plaintiffs in the first 
instance whereas the end-payors have a bit harder of a 
time to do so. 
DR. NGUYEN:  I agree on the issue with the 
end-payor cases.  I think even in the situation where 
we know, let’s say, 90 or 95 percent of the consumers 
would switch from the brand to the generic, it is 
impossible to know who they are. 
Or, in particular, if we have a case where 
the generic was not even in the market during the 
class period, then even if we know this is the 
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literature or the approximate market share of the 
generic, we cannot know in that situation who would 
have switched because there is actually no data to 
show that. 
DR. KORENKO:  We do have a question from one 
of our attendees: “It seems like the impact could be 
common even when there are individual differences in 
pricing.  Are there case precedents for finding common 
impact based on an analysis of average even though 
class members pay a variety of different prices that 
are not susceptible to common analysis?  If so, what 
kinds of models or fact patterns did you see in those 
cases?” 
MR. BANK:  I’ll start this off.  I think it 
is certainly possible that if the plaintiffs can show 
impact through common proof, that they can certify the 
class even where there are individualized differences 
in pricing.   
We see that with direct purchaser classes 
all the time in pharmaceutical antitrust cases.  You 
 81 
 
 
 
 
have the three big wholesalers and their pricing is 
certainly different than the medium-sized or small 
wholesalers out there, and yet direct purchaser 
classes are certified regularly.  So I do think that 
the experts can come up with models to show common 
impact and deal with differences in individualized 
pricing. 
Now, when there might be certain nuances as 
to a particular product or a market that causes wide 
variation in those differences in pricing, then 
defendants may have an argument to raise as to why the 
class in that particular circumstance should not be 
certified. 
MR. BERNICK:  I agree with that. 
Taking one step back — and no particular 
case comes to mind that illustrates this principle 
because it runs throughout the cases — I think it is 
really important to keep in mind the distinction 
between the fact of injury and the amount of injury.  
Typically, in the class certification stage the courts 
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are concerned with the fact of injury — can you 
demonstrate that all or substantially all class 
members have been harmed or not, and is there a 
proportion of the class members who have not been 
harmed?  That is what we have been talking about 
today. 
Typically, the fact that there is variation 
in the amount of injury, the fact that people paid 
different prices and might have been harmed by 
individual amounts, that alone often is not sufficient 
to the class certification, those individualized 
damages issues.   
At the class certification stage, it is 
really about: “Can you demonstrate impact on all or 
substantially all class members and is there some 
model for calculating aggregate damages?  If there are 
individualized damages issues, we will kick those down 
the road to deal with at a later day.” 
I don’t know if that addresses the question, 
but that is how we typically see the cases now. 
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MR. BANK: That’s exactly what the court in 
Lamictal said.  It said: “While every plaintiff must 
be able to show antitrust injury through evidence that 
is common to the class, damages need not be 
susceptible of measurement across the entire class for 
purposes at least of Rule 23(b)(3); so you can deal 
with some of those individualized inquiries as to 
damages later on.” 
MS. FOLEY:  On same point, what you see in 
the cases too is the plaintiffs have their model and 
then you have the defense side come in and test it 
with the individual class members’ data.  It is really 
on the margins.  Can you show that using, for example, 
the named direct purchasers’ data that a number of 
them are not actually paying that average wholesale 
price; some of them are actually paying much lower?  
Then you are going to get some traction. 
But it is hard because there are not that 
many named class members often in these cases and you 
can see the opportunity for the plaintiffs to test 
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their data in advance before they bring a case. It is 
often a number of the same firms bringing the cases 
over and over again.   
DR. KORENKO:  Danielle, your point actually 
dovetails very well into a second question that we 
received.  When Tram was discussing the uninjured 
customers in the Lamictal case — I think you know that 
twenty-three of the direct purchasers were found by 
the defendant’s expert to have potentially paid less, 
or at least no more, than the but-for price.  How do 
you efficiently deal with those individual inquiries?  
In other words, how do you identify those folks either 
before you go into litigation and test your own models 
as a plaintiff’s expert or as a defense expert to 
actually dig in and figure out who those folks are? 
MS. FOLEY:  As a defense lawyer, I am 
excited to see those examples.  I don’t think that is 
any surprise. 
Obviously, we rely on the economists to help 
us figure that out.  A lot of it really depends on the 
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model that the plaintiff’s experts try to put up and 
giving us a target to shoot at.   
Obviously, the devil is in the details — as 
I think Jeff was saying — the market, the product, the 
purchasers, and what uniquely was going on in each 
individual case.  But, obviously, we have a problem 
like you see in Lamictal — you are going to have a 
problem getting your class certified. 
DR. NGUYEN:  In the case of Lamictal, I 
think it is also important as a defendant’s expert to 
look at the situation regarding negotiations between 
the manufacturers and the pharmacies in the case 
because there are multiple individual negotiations 
going on.  Immediately we should be careful about 
relying on just one average price, but instead look at 
in the but-for world absent the price competition what 
would happen to individuals’ but-for prices across 
these pharmacies.  I think those are the question that 
will have to be dealt with on both sides. 
MR. BERNICK:  Lurking in the background of 
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the efficiency question is the concept, particularly 
for direct purchaser cases, of whether or not a class 
certification mechanism is even the efficient 
mechanism for resolving a dispute at all.   
I admit being biased somewhat because I 
represent defendants in these cases, but you cross a 
point where the class is so small and the 
individualized issues are so great that, to the point 
of the questioner, it is just not efficient. 
Then you have other case where the number of 
class members is higher and the amount of 
individualized variation is smaller and the class 
mechanism can be perhaps a more efficient way of 
resolving the dispute.   
But I think it is a much closer question 
when you are dealing with a direct purchaser case with 
a small set of plaintiffs, each of whom has a pretty 
large volume of commerce and could bring a claim on 
their own.  So at what point does it cross the hurdle 
of being an efficient case management tool to proceed 
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as a class?  I think that is one thing the courts are 
grappling with in those cases. 
DR. KORENKO:  I was going to say from an 
economist’s perspective that is where the discovery is 
really important.  Relying on defendant’s data, 
digging in where they sell to whom for what price — 
and, as Tram mentioned, there are negotiations — and 
you see there is a lot of variation in the prices and 
they are different across different purchasers and 
they are different across different purchasers over 
time.  These are things that you have to dig into both 
as a plaintiff’s expert and as a defense expert to 
figure out what is the appropriate way to capture what 
is really going on in this marketplace. 
I don’t have any more questions. 
I have one question actually that occurred 
to me while we were talking.  It’s funny that Jeff 
talked about looking at other cases that come in and 
we have to talk about averages and how they work in 
the pharmaceutical space, looking outside of pharma.   
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To what extent do you think the pharma cases that we 
are looking at will bleed into other areas, other 
industries and issues that we deal with in other 
cases, or is the supply chain so unique in 
pharmaceuticals that it does not really translate? 
MR. BANK:  I think that the courts in cases 
that are focused on other industries will have to look 
at the pharmaceutical antitrust cases because these 
issues are coming up so often in the pharmaceutical 
antitrust context that the courts are really digging 
in and trying to understand what it means to conduct a 
rigorous analysis and look at certain merits issues 
that overlap with class certification issues. 
The Tyson Foods case was not an antitrust 
case, but it certainly has impacted the antitrust 
world, and I think the vice-versa is true. 
Now, there are certain other industries with 
more simplified distribution chains where some of the 
specific nuanced arguments about pharma will not be 
relevant, but overall the concepts may be 
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transportable to those cases as well.  
MS. FOLEY:  I agree.  Without a doubt, given 
the number of the pharmaceutical cases that have 
percolated through the appellate courts, they are 
setting the standard for what you have to do.   
Whether it is the basic question of 
numerosity from the Modafinil case that we were 
talking about — you know, how many class members do 
you need to have a class — to the questions of using 
averages and individualized inquiries about impactives 
— the issues will spread and impact the entire range 
of antitrust class actions. 
DR. KORENKO:  Those are all the questions 
that we have.   
I want to thank our panelists.  This has 
been a fantastic discussion that brought up a lot of 
interesting issues.  I hope it has been informative to 
all of the participants and that you have learned a 
little bit about where we do stand in the world of 
pharmaceutical class certification and that there is a 
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little less confusion about where we are going to head 
with that. 
I also want to thank the folks at Fordham, 
specifically James and Karen for organizing this.  I 
want to thank Bill for the technical things working as 
well as they did.  I understand there are a few kinks 
to work out, but by and large this was pretty smooth. 
I want to thank everybody again.  Have a 
good day.  Everybody stay safe and healthy and enjoy 
the rest of the conference. 
